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Defining the Undefined: Using a Best
Interests Approach to Decide the Fate of
Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania
Fotini Antonia Skouvakis*
I. Introduction
On July 25, 1978, Louise Joy Brown, the world's first successful
"test-tube" baby, was born in Great Britain.1 Louise Brown is now an
adult, and the process of in vitro fertilization has matured as well. Lesley
Brown's pregnancy gave hope to hundreds of thousands of couples not
able to conceive. Yet as many cheered this new medical breakthrough,
others were worried about the future implications of nontraditional
means of conception.
For more than two decades, couples have used assisted reproductive
technologies (ARTs) to overcome infertility.2 Currently, 14% of couples
in the United States are facing problems with infertility. Because many
women are opting to postpone motherhood, this number is increasing.3
In women aged thirty to thirty-five, the infertility rate increases to 25%.
4
One third of births are by women above the age of thirty.5 Today,
reproductive medicine offers a variety of procedures to assist couples in
achieving pregnancy, but more than half of the couples with more than
two years of infertility treatment still fail to achieve pregnancy.6
In 2000, a total of 25,228 live-birth deliveries and 35,025 infants
resulting from 99,629 ART procedures were reported to the Center for
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; A.B., Barnard College of Columbia University, 2002.
1. See Jennifer Rosenberg, The World's First Test-Tube Baby, at
http://history1900s.about.com/library/weekly/aa04300Ia.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
2. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 5 (1994).
3. New infertility study--Significant difference between treatments, available at
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Disease Control and Prevention by 383 medical centers that performed
ART procedures in the United States and U.S. territories.7 These
numbers continue to grow exponentially. The most common of the ART
procedures is in vitro fertilization (IVF), which involves retrieving sperm
and eggs from the bodies of the male and female partners and placing the
eggs and sperm together in a laboratory dish to enhance the likelihood of
fertilization.8 If fertilization takes place, the resulting preembryos are
transferred back into the female's uterus where implantation and embryo
development will hopefully occur as in a normal pregnancy. 9
Most ART centers have determined the optimal number of
preembryos necessary to achieve successful pregnancy.' 0 However, the
IVF process may result in an excess number of preembryos than the
couple desires to have transferred to the uterus at one time. 1 If the
additional preembryos are of sufficiently good quality to undergo the
process of cryopreservation, this freezing procedure can provide another
opportunity for embryo transfer. 12  In other words, if the IVF-fresh
preembryo transfer does not result in pregnancy, the frozen preembryos
can subsequently be thawed and transferred to the uterus in either a
natural menstrual cycle or a hormonally controlled cycle.'
3
Alternatively, if the IVF procedure is successful, the preembryos can be
stored for several years should the couple decide to attempt to have more
children. 14
Problems arise when circumstances such as divorce force couples to
make unforeseen decisions about the fate of their stored preembryos.
Options for the disposition of cryopreserved preembryos include
destruction, donation to an infertile couple or individual, donation to
research, or use in future ART procedures upon the decision-maker's
request.'
5
Few states have had to judicially decide the proper disposition of
preembryos in the event of a couple's disagreement, and even fewer
7. National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology Success
Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Report, at
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/ART00/index.htm (last modified Oct 8, 2004).
8. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 8-9.
9. See id.
10. See David I. Hoffman, et al., Cryopreserved embryos in the United States and
their availability for research, FERTILITY AND STERILITY, May 2003, at 1063.
11. See N. Nikolettos, et al., Frozen pronuclear oocytes: advantages for the patient,




15. See Timothy G. Schuster, et al., Legal considerations for cryopreservation of
sperm and embryos, FERTILITY AND STERILITY, July 2003, at 65.
[Vol. 109:3
DEFINING THE UNDEFINED
states have passed legislation regulating preembryo disposition. In
deciding the disposition of preembryos, a court must first address the
legal status of the preembryos. Currently, there are three categories of
legal status: (1) life;16 (2) property; 17 and (3) something in between
deserving special respect. 18 Pennsylvania is among the majority of states
that have yet to address the controversy over preembryo disposition.
This comment will suggest how Pennsylvania courts would decide a
disagreement over the disposition of preembryos by considering
Pennsylvania public policy, legislative intent, and case law regarding
familial relationships.
Part II of this comment provides an overview of the IVF procedure
and addresses the legal status of the frozen preembryos. Part III sets out
the current case law addressing the disposition of cryopreserved
preembryos. Part IV traces the public policy of the highly conservative
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania through case law and legislation. The
current disposition procedures that the majority of fertility clinics in
Pennsylvania currently utilize are also identified. In addition, Part IV
addresses how Pennsylvania would decide the disposition of preembryos
by analyzing Pennsylvania statutes, case law, and public policy. Part V
concludes that in the event of a couple's disagreement, Pennsylvania
courts would use a "best interests" approach to determine preembryo
disposition.
II. Background
A. Overview of IVF and the Cryopreservation of Preembryos
Infertility is defined as the "diminished or absent ability to produce
offspring in either the male or the female.' 19 A woman's fertility begins
to decline around age twenty-eight and declines more rapidly after age
thirty-five.20  Although other specific causes of infertility are major
factors, the mother's age has become the most important determinant of
IVF success as scientific progress has overcome many of the other
hurdles. 21 According to fertility scientists, if the mother is under age
16. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 129-131 (2003).
17. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
18. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that preembryos
are neither life nor property, but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life).
19. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 896 (27th ed. 2000).
20. Infertility: Biotech company obtains exclusive to cryopreservation technology,
MEDICAL DEVICES & SURGICAL TECHNOLOGY WEEK, Sept. 14, 2003, at 108.
21. Reproductive Medicine: Fertility experts assess progress 25 years after first test-
tube baby's birth, WOMEN'S HEALTH WEEKLY, Aug. 14, 2003, at 49.
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thirty-five, the chance of pregnancy per cycle is probably greater than
40%.22 By age forty-five, however, the success rate drops to less than
1%.23
By far the most visible, dramatic, and important assisted
reproductive technique has been IVF.24 IVF depends on the ability to
stimulate the ovaries, retrieve multiple eggs, fertilize the eggs in vitro,
and transfer them into the uterus so that they may implant and come to
term as any other infant.25 IVF affords couples the opportunity to have a
child with the genetic makeup of the parents, as opposed to having a
family only through adoption or foster parenting. IVF has traditionally
been offered to women with blocked, diseased, or absent fallopian
tubes.2 6 Currently, however, it is offered to couples with a variety of
infertility disorders who have not responded to conventional treatment.
During IVF procedures, the number of human preembryos produced
is often in excess of the number that can effectively be implanted at one
time. 27 Because of the expense and inconvenience of extracting an egg
for IVF, couples prefer to extract a large number of eggs at once so that
the "extra" eggs will be readily available if the first implantation fails.
28
Advances in technology now allow patients to cryopreserve the
preembryos that are not transferred. This cryopreservation permits future
attempts at establishing pregnancy. 29 A recent study found that the
amount of cryopreserved preembryos currently in storage is slightly less
than 400,000.3o  The same study also found that 338 of the 340
responding clinics mandate that their patient or a couple sign a consent
form. 31 These consent forms ask the patient to indicate what should be
done with the frozen preembryos in the event that no one is able to make
a decision as to disposition.32
Even though the majority of clinics have patients sign a disposition
agreement, not all jurisdictions will enforce such an agreement in the
event of a disagreement between the signing parties because such an
agreement may be against the public policy of the particular state.33 New
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 8.
25. See id. at 8-9.
26. See id. at 9.
27. See Nicholas Wade, Clinics Hold More Embryos Than Had Been Thought, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2003, at A24.
28. Id.
29. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn. 1992).
30. See Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1068.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1066.
33. See, e.g. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001) (holding that if there was
an agreement regarding the disposition of the preembryos, it would not be enforced if the
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York, on the other hand, deems that "[a]greements between progenitors,
or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should
generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute
between them.,
34
Pennsylvania fertility clinics also require that patients sign
consent/disposition agreements before undergoing IVF. However, it is
not yet known whether Pennsylvania courts would enforce such
agreements. As discussed in Part IV, it is likely that a Pennsylvania
court, like the New Jersey Supreme Court, would find that such contracts
are void as against the state's public policy. If disposition contracts are
held void as against Pennsylvania public policy, then Pennsylvania
courts must determine the legal status of the preembryos in order to
decide their disposition.
B. The Legal Status of Preembryos
If a court refuses to honor a disposition agreement, it must then
determine the legal status of preembryos in order to decide their fate.
Case law and state legislation have developed three legal status
categories of preembryos: (1) life; (2) property; and (3) something in
between deserving special respect.35 Each of the three categories
represents very different approaches; however, no single one is without
flaws. Each approach has its own inherent obstacles and challenges in
categorizing the preembryos as the decision-making authority deems fit.
1. The Life Status
According to the Vatican, preembryos should be considered life and
therefore should be afforded all the same rights and legal protection as a
human being.36 The state of Louisiana also follows this approach.37
Outraged at a British law that mandated the destruction of preembryos in
storage for more than five years, the Vatican suggested that married
women volunteer to bring the preembryos to term.38  The Vatican
referred to the destruction of preembryos as "prenatal slaughter." 39 The
idea of donating an unwanted preembryo is not a novel one. In fact,
Louisiana mandates prenatal adoption "[i]f the in vitro fertilization
signing parties disagreed with the terms because it would be against the public policy of
the state).
34. Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 565 (N.Y. 1998).
35. See supra notes 16-18.
36. See Carrie Dowling, Vatican suggests "adoption" of frozen embryos, USA
TODAY, July 24, 1996, at Al.




PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
patients renounce ... their parental rights for in utero implantation, then
the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be available for adoptive
implantation" 40 because, according to the Louisiana Code, the fertilized
human ovum "shall not be intentionally destroyed."'41
The constitutionality of Louisiana's mandatory adoption statute has
yet to be effectively challenged. Such a statute may infringe upon one's
42right to privacy, which includes the fundamental right to procreate. On
the other hand, one commentator has argued that a statute mandating
prenatal adoption would be constitutional because it neither infringes
upon one's right to procreate, nor places any undue burden on the
donating couple.43
The Louisiana Code explicitly provides that "in disputes arising
between any parties regarding the in vitro fertilized ovum, the judicial
standard for resolving such disputes is to be in the best interest of the in
vitro fertilized ovum."'44  Thus far, Louisiana is the only state that
provides a statutory answer to the disposition question. Although the
legislature of New Jersey proposed a similar statute, it was not enacted.45
Advocates of the life approach argue that Roe v. Wade4 6 is not
implicated. They reason that a woman's right to bodily integrity is not
infringed upon because the preembryo has not yet been implanted.47
These proponents of the life approach argue that Roe allows a woman the
right to an abortion only because of bodily integrity issues.48 Therefore,
they advocate that because decisions regarding the disposition of
preembryos do not compromise a woman's right to bodily integrity, Roe
does not apply and should not hinder the life status of preembryos.
49
One problem with this approach is that based upon a thorough
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.
41. Id. § 129.
42. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (holding that an Oklahoma
statue that sterilized criminals convicted two or more times for crimes was
unconstitutional because it violated the "right to have offspring").
43. For a further discussion on constitutional privacy issues see Janette M. Puskar,
"Prenatal Adoption": The Vatican's Proposal to the In Vitro Fertilization Disposition
Dilemma, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 757 (1998).
44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131.
45. See A.B. 2011, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (proposed legislation, introduced March
11, 2002, to regulate the use of human embryos fertilized during in vitro procedures).
46. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding that abortion was within the scope of the
concept of personal liberty, but recognizing that the state had a compelling interest in
both the safety of the mother and the welfare of the fetus; however, this right was subject
to regulation and, thus, after the first trimester of pregnancy, the state could regulate the
abortion procedure to preserve and protect maternal health).
47. See Mark C. Haut, Divorce and the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 28 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 493, 497 (1999).




examination of the U.S. Constitution, relevant common law principles,
and the lack of scientific consensus as to when life begins, the United
States Supreme Court has explicitly refused to hold that the fetus
possesses independent rights under the law. 50 The Court concluded that
"the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the
whole sense." 51
2. The Property Status
The legal status of preembryos as property approach is completely
opposite of the approach viewing preembryos as life because the only
rights considered in the property approach are the rights of the IVF
52parents. As property, the preembryos would be subject to voluntary
and involuntary transfers including donation, sale, bequest, or
distribution. 3 Preembryos are not given any rights under this approach
and can be disposed of like any other property in a divorce settlement.54
In York v. Jones,55 a dispute arose when a couple wanted its frozen
preembryos transferred to a different fertility clinic. The fertility clinic
refused to transfer the frozen preembryos.56 The Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia held that there was a bailor-bailee
relationship between the plaintiffs and defendant; therefore, "the
obligation to return the property [was] implied from the fact of lawful
possession of the personal property of another., 57 The court in York
further held: "Gametes and concepti are the property of the donors. The
donors therefore have the right to decide at their sole discretion the
disposition of these items .58
The property approach has not been legislatively proposed in any
jurisdiction. Advocates of the life approach are highly critical of the
property approach because preembryos are not afforded any rights and
are treated as any other property would be treated. The York court is the
only court to have explicitly held that frozen preembryos are the property
of the donors. Responding to the York court's reasoning, the Tennessee
Supreme Court referred to the property approach as "troublesome" and
50. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing the Supreme
Court's holding in Roe v. Wade).
51. 410U.S.at162.
52. See Kathleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction
and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 193, 207 (1997).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
56. See id. at 424.
57. Id. at 425.
58. Id. at 427.
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refused to follow the Virginia court's holding.
59
3. The Special Respect Status
Under the special respect approach-the most widely used
approach-the preembryos are neither life nor property, but occupy a
middle ground. 60  This approach holds that "the preembryo deserves
respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not the respect
accorded to human persons. 61  This respect is afforded because the
preembryo has the potential to become a human person.62
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis adopted the special
respect approach. 63 The Davis court held that "[p]re-embryos are not,
strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential
for human life."64
This approach is carefully limited to ensure that any respect granted
to preembryos does not become superior to that afforded to the gamete
donors who created the preembryos. 65  Granting preembryos "special
respect," however, might cause the court to embark on a slippery slope
where preembryos and other nonviable entities consisting of human
genetic material are gradually treated like viable fetuses until they
acquire the same range of rights as human beings.66 In this manner,
"special respect" could one day trump the rights of the gamete donors
who created the preembryos.67
III. Case Law Regarding the Disposition of Preembryos
Six cases have squarely addressed the disposition of cryopreserved
preembryos. Each of the six courts used different reasoning in deciding
the fate of the preembryos in dispute, illustrating the many different
approaches to handling a disposition disagreement.
A. Davis v. Davis
During Mary Sue Davis's failed attempt at IVF, excess preembryos





64. Id. at 597.
65. See Jennifer L. Carow, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an
Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology,
43 DEPAUL L. REV. 523, 525 (1994).




were created, the disposition of which became the issue of litigation.68
The Davises did not execute a written agreement specifying how to
dispose of any unused preembryos that might result from the IVF
process.69 Mary Sue wanted the authority to donate the preembryos to a
childless couple, while her husband, Junior, was adamantly opposed to
such a donation and wanted the preembryos discarded. 0
The Davis court held that in disputes as to preembryos, an
agreement regarding the disposition of any untransferred preembryos
should be presumed valid and enforced as between the progenitors. 71 If
there was no prior agreement, as in Davis, the analysis of a court should
concentrate on the two aspects of procreational autonomy-the right to
procreate and the right not to procreate.72
According to the Davis court, the party wishing to avoid procreation
should prevail if the other party could achieve parenthood without the
embryos. 73 The burden imposed on Junior of unwanted parenthood
outweighed Mary Sue's wish to have her preembryos donated. 4 Even if
Mary Sue attempted to use the preembryos to achieve parenthood for
herself, the balancing test would still favor Junior because Mary Sue had
a "reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than
the use of the preembryos in question. 7 5 The Davis balancing test is one
of the possible ways to resolve disposition disputes. However, as
discussed in Part IV, it is unlikely that a Pennsylvania court would use
the Davis balancing test because only the rights of the gamete donors are
considered, thereby ignoring the rights of the preembryos.
B. Kass v. Kass
The disputed-over preembryos in Kass v. Kass were five stored
preembryos created during Maureen Kass's numerous IVF procedures.
76
Maureen wanted the preembryos implanted, claiming that it was her only
chance for genetic motherhood. 77  Her ex-husband, Steven Kass,
objected to the burdens of unwanted fatherhood, claiming that the parties
had signed a disposition agreement stating that in the event of divorce the
preembryos would be donated to the IVF program for research.7 8
68. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
69. See id. at 590.
70. See id.
71. Seeid. at 597.
72. See id. at 603.
73. See id. at 604.
74. See id.
75. Id.
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New York's highest court held that disposition of the preembryos
did not implicate Maureen's right to privacy or bodily integrity in the
area of reproductive choice; nor were the preembryos recognized as
persons for constitutional purposes. 79 The court further held that the
informed consent forms signed by the parties unequivocally manifested
their mutual intent that, under such circumstances, the preembryos were
to be donated for research to the IVF program.8°
The court did highlight that these types of agreements "may, of
course, be unenforceable as violative of public policy. '81 However,
because public policy was not raised on appeal, the court went no further
in its analysis. As discussed in Part IV, a Pennsylvania court would
likely find such disposition agreements void as against public policy;
therefore, the intentions of the signing parties would not be honored.
C. A.Z v. B.Z
At the time of A.Z. and B.Z.'s divorce, one vial containing four
cryopreserved preembryos remained in storage at a fertility clinic. 2 The
former husband filed a motion to obtain a permanent injunction
prohibiting the wife from using the remaining vial of preembryos. 83 The
former wife appealed the order that permanently enjoined her from
utilizing the frozen preembryos in question.
84
The question before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
involved the ambiguity of the consent form, signed before each IVF
procedure, in which the wife indicated that the preembryos were to be
returned to her for implantation.85 The court in A.Z. held that even if the
husband and wife had entered into an unambiguous agreement regarding
the disposition of the frozen preembryos, an agreement that compelled
one donor to become a parent against his or her will would not be
86enforced. As a matter of public policy, "forced procreation is not an
area amenable to judicial enforcement. 87
The court in A.Z further held that "prior agreements to enter into
familial relationships (marriage or parenthood) should not be enforced
against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions"
88
79. See id. at 564.
80. See id. at 567.
81. Id. at 565, n.4.
82. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Mass. 2000).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 1052.
85. See id. at 1054.
86. See id. at 1057.
87. Id. at 1058.
88. Id. at 1059.
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because "[t]his enhances the freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life.",89 "This policy is grounded in the notion that
respect for liberty and privacy requires that individuals be accorded the
freedom to decide whether to enter into a familial relationship." 90 As
discussed in Part IV, a Pennsylvania court would likely follow the
approach of this Massachusetts court and hold that the enforcement of
disposition agreements is void as against public policy.
D. J.B. v. M.B.
In JB. v M.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the parties
never entered into a separate binding contract providing for the
disposition of the preembryos; therefore, the Davis balancing test was
applied. 91 The court reasoned that enforcement of the wife's right not to
procreate "would not seriously impair the husband's right to procreate. 92
The husband's right to procreate is not lost if he is denied the opportunity
to use or donate the preembryos; in contrast, the wife's right not to
procreate may be lost through the attempted use or donation of the
preembryos.93
The JB. court further determined that even if there was an
agreement regarding the disposition of the preembryos, it would not be
enforced if, at a later time, the signing parties disagreed with the earlier
terms.94 The court adopted a rule "to enforce agreements entered into at
the time in vitro fertilization is begun, subject to the right of either party
to change his or her mind about disposition up to the point of use or
destruction of any stored preembryos. ' 95  The public policy concerns
involving family relationships are similar to those discussed in A.Z. v.
B.Z. by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.96
The JB. court concluded that in the "large majority of cases the
agreements will control, permitting fertility clinics ... to rely on their
terms, and "[o]nly when a party affirmatively notifies a clinic in
writing of a change in intention should the disposition issue be
reopened. 98  At this point, New Jersey courts would use the Davis
balancing test. Pennsylvania courts would likely treat disposition
89. Id. (internal citations omitted).
90. Id.
91. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 714-15 (N.J. 2001).
92. Id. at 716.
93. See id. at 717.
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agreements the same as the J.B. court; however, a Pennsylvania court's
second step would probably not be the Davis balancing test. 99
E. Litowitz v. Litowitz
The parties in Litowitz v. Litowitz entered into a cryopreservation
contract with a fertility center.'00 Under the terms of that contract, the
parties decided that any unused preembryos would be thawed out and not
allowed to undergo further development.1 ' The preembryos targeted for
use would be disposed of when they had been maintained in
cryopreservation for five years after the initial date of cryopreservation,
unless the parties extended their participation for an additional period of
time. 02 The wife claimed she had a contractual right to the preembryos
under the egg donor contract and that the court erred when it denied her
this contractual right. 0 3 The Washington Supreme Court held that the
egg donor contract was not at issue and was concerned only with the
preembryo cryopreservation contract. 10 4 Under that contract, the parties
agreed to submit to the court the question of disposition of remaining
preembryos in the event they could not reach mutual agreement.1
0 5
Because the parties neither reached an agreement nor requested an
extension of their contract with the fertility center, the remaining
preembryos were thawed in accordance with the couple's wishes in the
cryopreservation contract.1
0 6
F. In re Marriage of Witten
In the most recent case addressing the disposition of cryopreserved
preembryos, the Supreme Court of Iowa considered the disposition of
preembryos for a divorcing couple that had undergone IVF and had
stored preembryos at a medical center. 0 7 Using a consent agreement
provided by the medical center, "the parties agreed that the embryos
would not be transferred, released, or discarded without 'the signed
approval' of both."' 0 8 The court decided that the only question to be
considered was "whether such agreements are enforceable when one of
99. See Part IV of this comment for further discussion on how Pennsylvania would
address a change in the parties' intentions.
100. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 267 (Wash. 2002).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 270-71
104. Id.
105. Id. at 271.
106. Id.
107. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa 2004).
108. Id. at 773.
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the parties later changes his or her mind with respect to the proper
disposition of the embryos."' 0 9 The conclusion of the court was that "it
would be against the public policy of this state to enforce a prior
agreement between the parties in this highly personal area of
reproductive choice when one of the parties has changed his or her mind
concerning the disposition or use of the embryos."110 The court also
explained that "any contract that conflicts with the morals of the times or
contravenes any established interest of society is contrary to public
policy."
111
The Witten court expressed doubts over the use of a balancing
test.' 1 2 The rule it created was articulated instead as "contemporaneous
mutual consent."' 13 "Under that model, no transfer, release, disposition,
or use of the embryos can occur without the signed authorization of both
donors. . . . The practical effect will be that the embryos are stored
indefinitely unless both parties can agree to destroy the fertilized
eggs."1 4 As discussed in Part IV, a Pennsylvania court would likely find
such disposition agreements, despite the timing of the agreement, void as
against public policy; therefore, the intentions of the signing parties
would not be honored.
IV. Analysis
Neither the Pennsylvania courts nor the General Assembly has yet
addressed the growing problem of disagreements over cryopreserved
preembryos. Analyzing Pennsylvania case law addressing the public
policy regarding familial relationships and looking at Pennsylvania
legislation shows that the likely approach Pennsylvania would take is
slightly different from what other states have done.
A. Pennsylvania Public Policy
Pennsylvania's long-standing public policy has been to "preserv[e]
domestic harmony and felicity.""' 5  "The family is the basic unit in
society and the protection and preservation of the family is of paramount
public concern." ' 1 6 In addition to being an advocate for family harmony,
Pennsylvania is openly a pro-life state.
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v.
109. Id. at 773-774.
110. Id. at 781.
111. Id. at 780.
112. Id. at 783.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Meisel v. Little, 180 A.2d 772, 778 (Pa. 1962).
116. Savage v. Savage, 736 A.2d 633, 645 (Pa. Super. 1999).
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Wade,' 17 Pennsylvania law provided that whoever, with intent to procure
the miscarriage of any woman, unlawfully administered to her any
poison, drug or substance, or unlawfully used any instrument, or other
means, with the same intent, was guilty of a felony.' 1 8 Furthermore,
whoever unlawfully administered to any woman, pregnant or supposed
and believed to be pregnant, any drug, poison or other substance, or
unlawfully used any instrument or other means, with the intent to procure
the miscarriage of such woman, resulting in the death of such woman, or
any child with which she might have been pregnant was guilty of a
felony." 9 While the terms "abortion" and "miscarriage" were sometimes
used interchangeably, the word "abortion," "when used with respect to
human beings, [connoted] a criminal miscarriage as over against a
natural miscarriage."'
120
In 1973, the Court in Roe was presented with a constitutional
challenge to state criminal abortion legislation.'12  Although the Court
was concerned with Texas statutes that made it a crime to procure, or
attempt to procure, an abortion, except with respect to an abortion
procured or attempted per medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother, similar statutes existed in a majority of states at that
time, including Pennsylvania. 122  The Court held that state criminal
abortion laws, which except from criminality only a lifesaving procedure
on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy, and
other interests involved, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 23 The Due Process Clause protects against state action the
right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her
pregnancy. 124  Though the state cannot override that right, it has
legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and
the potentiality of human life, each of whose interests grow and reach a
4 C 125"compelling" point at various stages of the woman's approach to term.
Following the decision in Roe, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed
a comprehensive statute known as the Abortion Control Act, which
117. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
118. See Commonwealth v. Willard, 116 A.2d 751, 752 (Pa. Super. 1955) (statute sets
forth acts that constitute attempt to produce abortion and makes mere attempt a crime).
119. See Commonwealth v. Longwell, 79 Pa. Super. 68, 74 (1922) (held one who
furnished a drug to the woman and directed her how to use it, with intent to procure
miscarriage, may be guilty of "administering" drug though he does not actually convey it
to her lips).
120. Commonwealth v. Sierakowski, 154 Pa. Super. 321, 324 (1944).
121. SeeRoev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
122. Seeid. at 176.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 163.
125. See id. at 154
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contained stringent limitations on abortions. 126 The Abortion Control
Act was approved by the Governor of the Commonwealth on June 11,
1982 and was to become effective December 8, 1982.127 Before its
effective date, however, litigation was instituted in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 1
28
The United States Supreme Court, in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, upheld, in a five-to-four
decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' invalidation of specified
provisions of Pennsylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act. 129 The Court
held that the states are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal
health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing
pregnancies. 30 The questioned provisions of the Pennsylvania statute
wholly subordinated constitutional privacy interests and concerns with
maternal health in an effort to deter a woman from making a decision
that, with the help of her physician, is hers to make.' 31 The Court in
Thornburgh upheld the Court of Appeals' invalidation of the provision
that requires the physician, after the first trimester, to report the basis for
his determination that a child is not viable. 32 This trimester framework
was overruled because it was inconsistent with Roe's statement that the
state has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the
unborn. 
33
The Supreme Court, in 1992, concluded that in order to protect the
central right recognized by Roe and at the same time accommodate the
state's interest in potential life, the "undue burden" standard should be
employed. 34 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the Court found that an undue burden existed in some of the
provisions of the 1982 Abortion Control Act, and held that a provision of
the law was invalid because its purpose or effect was to place substantial
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus
attains viability.'3 5  In particular, the sections that the Court held
constitutional included those relating to individual issues, the informed
consent provision (including a twenty-four-hour waiting period), the
126. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 750 (1986).
127. Seeid. at751.
128. See id. at 752.
129. See id. at 747.
130. See id. at 759.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 772.
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parental consent provision, and the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements; however, the spousal notification provision was held to
constitute an undue burden, and was therefore unconstitutional. 1
36
The above case law illustrates the conservative public policy of
Pennsylvania. Since the first abortion case came before the United States
Supreme Court, Pennsylvania has consistently attempted to regulate
abortion through its Abortion Control Act. The Abortion Control Act
currently provides that the legislative intent in every relevant civil or
criminal proceeding is to construe the common and statutory law of
Pennsylvania "so as to extend to the unborn the equal protection of the
laws and to further the public policy of this commonwealth encouraging
childbirth over abortion."'1 37 Taking into consideration the current state
of the legislation, it is apparent that Pennsylvania has the highest regard
for human life.
The Abortion Control Act also provides that "no abortion shall be
performed except by a physician after... [h]e determines that, in his best
clinical judgment or in the best clinical judgment of a referring
physician, the abortion is necessary." 138  In determining whether an
abortion is necessary: "[A] physician's best clinical judgment may be
exercised in the light of all factors (physical, emotional, psychological,
familial and the woman's age) relevant to the well-being of the woman.
No abortion which is sought solely because of the sex of the unborn child
shall be deemed a necessary abortion."'
139
In the "prohibited acts" section of the Abortion Control Act, IVF is
mentioned for the purpose of regulating industry practice. 140 The section
provides: "All persons conducting, or experimenting in, in vitro
fertilization shall file quarterly reports with the department, which shall
be available for public inspection and copying, containing the ...
[n]umber of fertilized eggs destroyed or discarded."'4 1 Although this
statute may seem to indicate that Pennsylvania approves of discarding
preembryos, its meaning is not quite that clear or simple. The statute's
purpose seems to be to regulate IVF through quarterly reports. Because
the legislature has not yet addressed the discarding of preembryos, this
statute is simply a mechanism used to ensure that IVF clinics are keeping
good records until such a law is passed. Therefore, as long as IVF
patients want their preembryos discarded, clinics will comply with the
patients' desires.
136. See id. at 899-900.
137. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3213 (2004).
138. Id. § 3204.
139. Id.
140. See id. § 3213.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
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An unborn child is defined in the Abortion Control Act as "an
individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until
live birth. 1 42 Fertilization (and conception) means the fusion of a human
spermatozoon with a human ovum. 143  According to this definition,
fertilized eggs, which include preembryos produced during IVF, are
entitled to equal protection under the law. However, it is a reasonable
assumption that the legislative intent was to apply the definition of an
unborn child only to a child inside the womb of his or her mother and not
to an unborn child in a Petri dish.
Analyzing only the plain meaning of the definition of unborn child,
thereby including preembryos within that definition, results in an
inconsistency within the Pennsylvania legislation that poses a problem
regarding the destruction of preembryos. The Crimes Against the
Unborn Child Act144 makes it a crime to cause the death of an unborn
child. 45 Prior to the Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act, a fetus could
not be a victim of murder charges because the law did not recognize a
fetus as a person.1 46 As a result, the murder charges brought against the
defendant in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Booth, who was driving
under the influence and collided with a woman who was thirty-two
weeks pregnant, killing her unborn child, were dismissed.147 Because the
Unborn Child Act was not enacted until after the decision in Booth, there
was no crime committed when the unborn child was killed.
Juxtaposing the plain meaning of the Unborn Child Act with the
plain meaning of the Abortion Control Act produces an odd result. It is
not plausible to assume that the legislature contemplated the provision
requiring the quarterly reporting of discarded or destroyed preembryos
when enacting the Unborn Child Act. The reasoning in the Booth case
suggests a narrow construction of the Unborn Child Act, implying that in
order for crimes to be committed against an unborn child, that child must
be in the womb of the mother.1 48 Using the legislative intent implied in
142. Id. § 3203.
143. Id.
144. Id. § 2603. The Crimes Against the Unborn Child Act provides:
An individual commits criminal homicide of an unborn child if the individual
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of an
unborn child in violation of section 2604 (relating to murder of unborn child) or
2605 (relating to voluntary manslaughter of unborn child). Criminal homicide
of an unborn child is classified as murder of an unborn child or voluntary
manslaughter of an unborn child.
Id.
145. An unborn child is defined as "an individual organism of the species homo
sapiens from fertilization until live birth." Id. § 3203.
146. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Booth, 766 A.2d 843, 844 (Pa. 2001).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 853.
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Booth does not produce an odd result because it is likely that the
legislature would not consider preembryos as unborn children (even
though the plain meaning of the definition seems to imply otherwise).
Because of the discarding provision in the Abortion Control Act, it
can be inferred that Pennsylvania would not pass a law as stringent as
that of Louisiana. 49 According to the Louisiana Code, the fertilized
human ovum "shall not be intentionally destroyed."1 50  By adopting a
statute as pro-life as the one in Louisiana, Pennsylvania would contradict
the legislative intent in passing section 3213 of the Abortion Control Act,
which requires the reporting of the discarded or destroyed preembryos
produced during IVF. However, because the possibility exists that
Pennsylvania would not codify the illegality of intentional destruction
does not mean that a Pennsylvania court would order the destruction of
preembryos. Taking into account the public policy of this state, courts
would look to the best interests of the preembryos, and therefore not
order their destruction.
B. What Pennsylvania Infertility Clinics are Requiring of Clients
Curious as to how Pennsylvania infertility clinics are handling the
"leftover" preembryos, I spoke with twenty clinics located throughout
the state. Acting as a potential client, I asked these clinics what would
happen to any unused preembryos. I discovered that all twenty clinics
have their clients sign informed consent forms that indicate the client's
wishes regarding any unused preembryos. If there is a couple involved,
both parties must agree to a specific type of disposition and sign the
required consent forms. The basic disposition options included:
destruction (which would occur only after a successful pregnancy
resulting in a live birth); cryopreserving the preembryos indefinitely (as
long as someone paid the yearly fee ranging from $100 to $1000 a year);
donating the preembryos to an infertile couple; or donating them to
research. 151
149. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.
150. Id.
151. If within the definition of unborn child, the Abortion Control Act would prohibit
experimentation on my preembryos. Section 3216 provides:
[A]ny person who knowingly performs any type of nontherapeutic
experimentation or nontherapeutic medical procedure (except an abortion as
defined in this chapter) upon any unborn child, or upon any child born alive
during the course of an abortion, commits a felony of the third degree.
"Nontherapeutic" means that which is not intended to preserve the life or health
of the child upon whom it is performed.
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3216 (2004). However, as discussed above, preembryos might not fall




Upon asking if there was ever a disagreement between the
contracting parties regarding the disposition of the preembryos, all
twenty clinics denied having such knowledge. Further inquiry revealed
that clinics simply thought that the disposition contracts entered into
prior to the disagreement would control the fate of the preembryos. The
overwhelming response to my inquiries was that the issue had never
crossed the minds of those whom I interviewed.
C. What Would the Pennsylvania Courts Do?
1. If There is No Disagreement
If there is no disagreement between parties regarding the disposition
of their preembryos, Pennsylvania IVF clinics will continue to enforce
the disposition agreements. This rule parallels step one of the J.B. case:
to enforce agreements entered into at the time in vitro fertilization is
begun, subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind about
disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored
preembryos.152 Therefore, in a disagreement that is below the radar of
the court, the disposition agreement signed at the time of the initial IVF
procedure would control.
2. In the Event of a Disagreement
Pennsylvania's strong (and very conservative) public policy
concerns regarding familial relationships would direct this state to look
to the best interests of the preembryo. "[I]t is the public policy of the
Commonwealth to favor childbirth over abortion."1 53  Because of the
definitional inconsistencies within the Pennsylvania legislation, the
Unborn Child Act and the Abortion Control Act would not provide
152. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001).
153. 62 P.S. § 453 (2003). In its entirety, § 453 provides:
Since it is the public policy of the Commonwealth to favor childbirth over
abortion, no Commonwealth funds and no Federal funds which are
appropriated by the Commonwealth shall be expended by any State or local
government agency for the performance of abortion: Provided, That nothing in
this act shall be construed to deny the use of funds where a physician has
certified in writing that the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus
were carried to full term or except for such medical procedures necessary for
the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported
promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service. Nothing
contained in this section shall be interpreted to restrict or limit in any way,
appropriations, made by the Commonwealth or a local governmental agency to
hospitals for their maintenance and operation, or, for reimbursement to
hospitals for services rendered which are not for the performance of abortions.
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reliable guidance to a court. Courts would have to base decisions on the
well-settled public policy of this the Commonwealth, which is to
preserve potential human life.
Even though it is the public policy of Pennsylvania to favor
childbirth, this state cannot prohibit a woman from having an abortion.
However, because the disposition of cryopreserved preembryos does not
implicate a woman's right to privacy or her right to bodily integrity in
the area of reproductive choice,154 there is no issue of bodily integrity
with respect to a frozen preembryo. Because there is no possible First
Amendment 155 violation, Pennsylvania can adhere to its public policy of
favoring childbirth. As such, a Pennsylvania court would not order the
destruction of the preembryos. Instead, the court would "award" the
preembryos to whomever wanted to give them life. If neither of the
gamete donors wanted to give the preembryos life, then the court would
place the preembryos for adoption.
Although many states have applied the Davis balancing test
weighing the right to procreate against the right not to procreate, the
public policy of Pennsylvania would not permit the courts to follow such
a balancing test. Instead, a Pennsylvania court would reason that only
the rights of the preembryos are at issue, and not those of the gamete
donors. Therefore, there is no need to apply a Davis balancing test
because the rights of the respective parties would not be considered.
The decision not to consider the rights of the gamete donors does
not infringe upon procreative liberty because the donors have voluntarily
made the decision to procreate. After undergoing IVF, the donors have
procreated, and therefore cannot argue that their procreative rights will
be infringed upon if they are made parents against their will. Upon
leaving the IVF clinic, the donors have relinquished any procreative
rights as to the preembryos. They executed their rights to procreate
when deciding to undergo IVF and cannot later claim that they are being
deprived of these rights.
The disposition contract that was entered into by the parties would
not be enforced because it would be void as against the public policy of
Pennsylvania. "A contract wherein a mother of a child agrees to
adoption of her child by another in consideration of a monetary
consideration to herself is void as against public policy.' 56 If mere
compensation for adoption is against the public policy of Pennsylvania,
then a contract regarding decisions of life and death would certainly be
Id.
154. See Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 564 (1998).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
156. In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 933 (Pa. 1986).
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void as against public policy. Pennsylvania courts would follow their
sister states' courts of New Jersey 57 and Massachusetts, 58 and not give
any weight to the disposition agreement.
V. Conclusion
As long as there is no disagreement, contracts entered into upon IVF
will control the disposition of the preembryos. In the event of a
disagreement, the public policy of Pennsylvania dictates that these
contracts would not be enforced because they are void as against public
policy. Instead, a "best interests" approach would be applied to resolve
disagreements over preembryo disposition. By looking to the best
interests of the preembryos, Pennsylvania would adopt its own approach
to resolving such disputes.
Categorizing the preembryos as life does not threaten a woman's
right to privacy because the preembryos in dispute are outside the
woman's body. As the advocates of the life approach suggest, decisions
regarding the disposition of preembryos do not compromise a woman's
right to bodily integrity, therefore Roe v. Wade does not apply and should
not hinder the life status of preembryos.
Finally, Pennsylvania would not apply the Davis balancing test
because the rights of the gamete donors would not be at issue; the only
rights at issue would be those of the preembryos. Therefore, in the event
of a dispute, a Pennsylvania court would try to determine what would be
in the best interests of the preembryos.
157. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001).
158. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000).
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